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Thepaperexploresagame-theoreticmodelofpettycorruptioninvolvingasequence
of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur’s project is approved
if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value
isobservedonlybytheentrepreneur,butitsdistributioniscommonknowledge.Each
bureaucrat clears the project only if a bribe is paid. The bribe for qualiﬁed projects
(“extortion”) and unqualiﬁed projects (“capture”) may differ. We identify the nature
and welfare implications of different types of equilibria under appropriate technical
assumptions on the structure of the game.
Key words corruption, repeated games, hold up, extortion, capture
JEL classiﬁcation C73, D61, D73, O12, O17
Accepted 3 April 2007
1 Introduction1
The primary aim of this paper is to develop game theoretic models of “petty” corruption
that occurs when private citizens (as e.g. investors or business managers) have to deal with
relativelylowlevelbureaucratsingettingapprovalsofspeciﬁcprivileges(e.g.registrationof
a new ﬁrm as a legitimate business activity that meets the regulatory standards or approval
of loans from state-owned banks, getting a passport or a driver’s license).1 The basic ingre-
dients of corruption (emphasized by Klitgaard 1988), government monopoly, discretion
in interpreting “laws” or “proper procedure” and a lack of direct accountability, appear in
many ways in different contexts, and typically result in “small” bribes (e.g. “speed money”
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1 Corruption is deﬁned as the use of public ofﬁce for private gains. Petty corruption is often distinguished
from “grand” corruption and “inﬂuence peddling”. Countries vary signiﬁcantly in the pervasiveness and types of
corruption, and the literature on various aspects of corruption is huge. See, in particular, the collection by Elliott
(1997) and the book by Rose-Ackerman (1999) for comprehensive lists of references. Andvig (1991), Bardhan
(1997) and Lambsdorff (2001) are also useful surveys. The annual reports from Transparency International
available at its website also provide valuable insights.
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anti-investment,anditcreatesanenvironmentthatunderminesthelegitimacyofthestate.
We do not make any attempt to review and do justice to the immense literature on cor-
ruption that provides valuable insights into so many facets of the problem across the
countries at different stages of economic development. A relatively small part of the litera-
tureusesformalmodels,andourtaskistoencouragefurtherexplorationinthisdirection.2
Two types of intervention by bureaucrats should be distinguished. First, applications
thatare“qualiﬁed”or“legitimate”maybedisapprovedifbribesarenotpaid;werefertothis
as “extortion” or “hold up”. Second, in return for bribes, applications that fail the relevant
regulatory standards may be approved; we refer to this as “capture”. Therefore, the bribes
may depend upon the “quality” of the projects. The ﬁrst type has been widely discussed
by policy-makers in developing countries. “Competing bureaucracies, each of which can
stop a project from proceeding, hamper investment and growth around the world, but
especially in countries with weak governments...” (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, p. 615; see
also Rose-Ackerman 1999). The second type helps sustain activities that may pose danger
to public safety or even national security (e.g. unsafe buildings, import and transportation
of drugs, and explosives (see Vittal in Gupta 2001), and challenge the rule of law.
Inourgeneralmodel,entrepreneursmayapply,insequence,toa“track”oftwoormore
bureaucrats for approval of their projects. Each entrepreneur (EP) has a project that has
a speciﬁc (expected present) value V t h a tw o u l db er e a l i z e di ft h ep r o j e c tw e r ea p p r o v e d .
Thisvalueisknowntotheentrepreneur,butnottothebureaucrats.Theentrepreneurmust
apply to each bureaucrat (BU) in the track in a prescribed order, and his or her project
is approved if and only if every bureaucrat in the track approves it. Each bureaucrat may
demand a bribe as a condition of approval. To make the model precise, we assume that the
entrepreneurs arrive at a ﬁxed rate of one per “period” and that their successive project
values are independent and identically distributed with a probability distribution that is
common knowledge to all the players. In fact, our simplifying assumption is that V is
uniformly distributed over [0,1]. At any step in the period the entrepreneur may refuse to
pay the bribe, in which case he or she leaves the process and the value of the project is not
realized, although the enterpreneur loses the total amount of bribes paid plus application
and qualiﬁcation costs incurred up to that point. If the project is approved by the entire
track, the entrepreneur receives the value of the project, minus the total amount of bribes
paid and the total cost of qualiﬁcation and application. The payoff to a bureaucrat in that
periodistheamountofthebribeheorshereceives,ifany,andthebureaucrat’stotalpayoff
in the game is the expected sum of discounted bribes he or she receives. (The discount
factor is the same for all the BU.)
As a ﬁrst step in the development of a formal model, we make some simplifying
assumptions. First, to qualify a project (at least “on paper”) the entrepreneur incurs a cost
rV wherer >0.Thereisalsoanapplicationcostc ≥0,thesameforeachofthebureaucrats.
Moreover, realistic or not, we also assume the following about the information that the
players have about the actions of other players:
1. Players remember their own actions and those of the players they transact with.
2 Given the space limitation, we donot review the formal models.See Lui (1985,1986), Banerjee (1997),Burget
and Che (2004), Compte et al. (2004), Marjit et al. (2000) and Mookherjee and Png (1992, 1995).
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2. Within any single period, no bureaucrat knows the bribes demanded by the other
bureaucrats.
3. Every player learns the actions of the other players in previous periods, perhaps with
some delay.
Recallthata(Bayes–Nash)equilibriumofthecorrespondinggameisaproﬁleofstrate-
gies such that no player can increase his or her expected payoff by unilaterally changing his
orherstrategy.OurgoalistodescribetheBayes–Nashequilibriaofthecorrespondinggame.
(We restrict attention to equilibria with undominated strategies.) With some additional
technical assumptions we can show:
1. In a one-period version of the game (only one entrepreneur), there is no equilibrium in
whichtheprojectisapprovedwithpositiveprobability.However,thereisanequilibriumin
whichtheentrepreneuerrefusestoapplytoeventheﬁrstbureaucratinthetrack,nomatter
what the value of his or her project (in [0, 1], the range of its probability distribution). The
latter is called a null-strategy-proﬁle equilibrium.
2. Inthesequentialversionofthegame,ifthebureaucratsaresufﬁcientlypatient(discount
factorcloseenoughtounity),thentherearemanyequilibria,andwedescribealargefamily
of them that we call trigger strategy proﬁle (TSP) equilibria. In a TSP, there is a target (or
“normal”) bribe proﬁle. If a bureaucrat deviates from the target bribe proﬁle, this triggers
(after some delay) a reversion to the null-strategy-proﬁle equilibrium for a prescribed
number of periods (the punishment phase), after which the players return to their normal
behavior.
3. For any given proﬁle of strictly positive normal bribe demands, if the bureaucrats are
sufﬁciently patient, then there is a TSP equilibrium that sustains those bribes (a “folk
theorem”). Hence, for a sequence of bureaucrats’ discount factors approaching 1, there is
a corresponding sequence of TSP equilibria that approach “social efﬁciency”.
Wealsoexamineinmoredetailtwo“extreme”TSPequilibria.First,asecond-bestequilibrium




best social loss can be attained with a TSP equilibrium.)
5. In a second-best TSP equilibrium, the farther along the bureaucrat is in the track, the
larger will be his or her bribe.
6. If the track is replaced by a single bureaucrat, then the second-best equilibrium bribe
totalwillbesmaller.Theotherextremeequilibriamaximizethetotalexpectedbribeincome
withinthefamilyofTSPequilibria;callsuchaTSPequilibriumabribe-income-maximizing
equilibrium (BIME). We show that in a BIME, no project is qualiﬁed. Call a bribe proﬁle
ﬁrst-best for the bureaucrats if it maximizes the total bribe income without the constraint
that it be an equilibrium. We show that, if a BIME is not ﬁrst-best for the bureaucrats,then
(corresponding to results (5) and (6) above):
7. In a BIME, the farther along the bureaucrat is in the track, the larger will be his or her
bribe.
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8. If the track is replaced by a single bureaucrat, then the total bribes in the BIME will be
larger.
Finally:
9. If the bureaucrats are sufﬁciently patient, then there is a BIME that is ﬁrst-best for the
bureaucrats.
The conclusions (6) and (8) are relevant to an oft-proposed policy recommendation
that in any jurisdiction the track of multiple bureaucrats should be replaced by a single
“window”towhichtheentrepreneurcanapply.Ouranalysisshowsthatonecannotconclude
thatsuchachangewillunambiguouslyresultinanincreaseinsocialefﬁciency(seeSection4.1).
Our results also enable us to assess another much-advocated reform, the rotation of
bureaucratsamongtracks.Themultiplicityofequilibriaagainmaketheresultsambiguous.
However, our analysis suggests that, under certain plausible circumstances the rotation
policy will actually result in a decrease in social efﬁciency (see Section 4.2).
We conclude with a few suggestions for generalizing our model in different directions.
The brief remarks in the present paper on background of the theoretical model of the
present paper, and on the policy implications of our analsysis, draw heavily on the more
extensive discussion in (Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. 2007). Also, some of the theoretical
results in the present paper are announced there, without proofs. However, those results









tion on the unit interval. The entrepreneur learns the value of the project at the beginning
ofthegame.Thebureaucratneverlearnsthevalue,butdoesknowitsdistribution.Inorder
to realize this value, the project must be approved by BU. Formally, to qualify for approval,
EPmustfulﬁllcertainrequirements,atacostR(V),whichissubtractedfromthevalue.We
assume that this cost is proportional to the project value:
R(V)=rV, r >0. (1)
(However, more general formulations would be amenable to analysis.) The parameter r is
given exogenously. In addition, in order to apply to BU, EP must incur a cost, c ≥0. In
some cases it will turn out to matter whether this cost is zero or strictly positive.
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It is important to point out that our speciﬁcation (1) of a qualiﬁcation cost falls short
of a realistic description of the process of approval and implementation of investment
projects in many contexts. An EP typically incurs some cost in preparing a proposal that
is “qualiﬁed on paper” (and submits an estimate of costs for upholding the regulatory
standards); but the more substantial part of the cost is incurred during the phase of actual
construction, which is often subject to further on-site inspections. In (1) we shorten this
process by assuming that the EP will implement the exact proposal qualiﬁed on paper. In
contrast,anunqualiﬁedprojectapprovedthroughbriberywillnotresultinanysubsequent
cost to the EP (ﬁnes/settlement of liability claims etc.). A more elaborate model would be
needed to capture these intricacies, but we do not expect that our theoretical results would
be signiﬁcantly affected.
The bueaucrat can demand a bribe before approving the project; this is a “take-it-or-
leave-it” demand. Furthermore, BU can approve the project even if it does not meet the
formal qualiﬁcation. If EP pays the bribe demanded by BU, the project will be approved,
whether or not it is formally qualiﬁed. We shall assume that
c +r <1, (2)
which guarantees that, if no bribes were demanded, and only qualiﬁed projects were accepted,
then with strictly positive probability it would be proﬁtable to qualify some projects and
apply for approval. Recall that V is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Here is the timeline of events:
Step0 “Nature” determines V according to its distribution, and EP learns its magnitude.
Step1 EP decides whether to qualify the project and whether to apply to BU for approval.
Step 2 If EP applies, BU observes whether the project is qualiﬁed, and then demands a
(nonnegative) bribe.
Step3 IfEPpaysthebribe,theprojectisapproved;otherwiseitisnotapproved,EPderives
no value from it, and loses any previously incurred costs.
Let
q = 1 or 0 according as EP does or does not qualify the project,
a = 1 or 0 according as EP does or does not apply to BU,
b = the bribe demanded by BU (b ≥ 0),
p = 1 or 0 according as EP does or does not pay the bribe.
(3)
Without loss of generality, assume that a =0 ⇒ p =0, and that a =0 ⇒ q =0.
A strategy for EP is a triple (Q, A, P) of functions that determine his or her actions as a
function of his or her information at the corresponding step; therefore,
q = Q(V),
a = A(V),
p = P(V, b).
(4)
International Journal of Economic Theory 4 (2008) 273–297 C   IAET 277Petty corruption: A game-theoretic approach Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky et al.
A strategy for BU is a function B that determines the bribe demanded as a function of
whether the project is qualiﬁed:
b = B(q). (5)
T h ep a y o f f st oE Pa n dB Ua r e ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
U0 =−qrV−ac+ p(V −b), (6)
U1 = pb. (7)
As usual, an equilibrium of the game is a pair of strategies, one for each player, such
that no player can increase his or her expected payoff by unilaterally changing his or her
strategy. A strategy is (weakly) undominated if there is no other strategy that yields the
player as high a payoff for all strategy proﬁles of the other players, and a strictly higher
payoffforsomestrategyproﬁleoftheotherplayers.Weshallconﬁneourselvestoequilibria
in undominated strategies.
Theorem 1 If c >0, then there is no equilibrium in which the probability that a project is
approved is strictly positive.
Forthecompleteproof,seetheAppendix.ThebasicideaisthatifEPappliestoBU,this
provides BU with information about the value of the project, which in turn inﬂuences the
size of the bribe that he or she demands. Suppose that EP expects BU to demand a bribe µ
for a qualiﬁed project and θ for an unqualiﬁed project, and the (gross) value of the project
is V. There are 3 cases.
Case 1 If rV+µ>θand V >θ, then EP will apply with an unqualiﬁed project. In this
case,BUinfersthatrV+µ≥θ andV >θ.(N otethatifrV+µ=θ,thenEPisindifferent
betweenqualifyingandnotqualifying.)BUwillthendemandabribe,sayb,thatmaximizes
his or her expected bribe income, conditional on V satisfying the last two inequalities.
In computing this optimal bribe demand, BU takes account of the fact that EP will pay
the bribe b if and only if V >b, because the cost of application is “sunk”. Using Lemma 1
(below), one can show that in this case BU’s optimal bribe strictly exceeds θ.H e n c ei tw a s
not rational for EP to expect BU to demand the bribe θ.
Case 2 If rV+µ<θ and V >θ,t h e nE Pw i l la p p l yw i t haq u a l i ﬁ e dp r o j e c t .As i m i l a r
argument shows that in this case BU’s optimal bribe strictly exceeds rV +µ.
Case 3 If neither Case 1 nor Case 2 holds, then EP will not apply.
In summary, the proof of the theorem shows that, whatever bribes EP expects, if EP
appliesthenBU’soptimalbribewillbelarger.Itfollowsthatthereisnoequilibriuminwhich
EP will apply.
As a supplement to Theorem 1, we also consider the case in which there is no cost of
application. We shall show that if c =0 then the only equilibria are those of the following
form: As above, deﬁne µ and θ by
µ= B(1), θ = B(0);
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then
A(V) = 1a n dQ(V)=0f o ra l lV,





We note that the following lemma (proved in Section 5.1) is an important step in
the proofs of these results, because it helps derive the properties of BU’s best-response
mapping.
Lemma1 SupposethatEPhasapplied,andBUinfersthat h ≤V ≤k,where 0≤h<k≤1;









Consider the case in which there is a single EP who has a project value V and faces a track
of N bureaucrats (N ≥2) arranged in a speciﬁc order. To get the project approved, the EP
must apply to and get approval or clearance from each BU in the prescribed order. If the
project is rejected by any BU, the game ends, and the EP does not proceed farther in the
track. That the project value V is uniformly distributed over the unit interval is common
knowledge; but only the EP observes the realized value at the beginning of the game. No
bureaucrat knows the bribes demanded by other bureaucrats.
We sketch the rather obvious modiﬁcations of the notation by using the appropriate
subscript. First, the EP decides whether to qualify the project (q=1) or not (q=0). Of
course, the EP will not qualify if he or she does not intend to apply to BU1.L e tan =1o r
0 according as the EP does or does not apply to BUn(n≥1). If the EP applies to BUn,h e
or she incurs a cost c ≥0 (assumed to be the same for all bureaucrats), and then learns the
magnitudeofbn,thebribedemandedb yB U n.L etpn =1or0whethertheEPdoesordoes
notpaythebribe,respectively.Notethatifan =0o rpn =0f o ran yn≥1,thegameiso v e r .
Naturally, if an =0t h e npn =0, and if pn =0, then am =0f o ra l lm>n.
Denote by step 0 the initial part of the game in which the EP decides whether to qualify
theproject,andcallthepartofthegameinwhichtheEPfacesBUn then-thstep(n=1,...,
N). The action of the EP at step 0 is q,a n da tt h en-th step is a pair (an, pn). The action of
BUn is bn (the convention is applied even for steps at which an =0).
For n≥1, let Hn d e n o t et h eh i s t o r yo ft h eg a m et h r o u g hs t e pn (i.e. the sequence
of actions taken by all the players through n) .As t r a t e g yf o rt h eE Pi sas e q u e n c e ,α =
{Q, A1, P 1 ...An, P n}, of functions that completely specify the EP’s actions at each step
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according to:
q = Q(V),
an = An(V, Hn−1),
pn = Pn(V, Hn−1, an, bn). (10)
Recall that it is assumed that no bureaucrat knows the bribes demanded by other
bureaucrats. Therefore, BUn’s bribe depends only on the quality of the project: his or her
strategy is a function Bn that determines his or her bribe demand according to
bn = Bn(q).3 (10 )
To complete the formal description of the game we describe the players’ pay-offs. The
pay-off of BU n is the bribe, if paid:
un = pnbn. (11)
Thepay-offfortheEPisthevalueoftheprojectifapprovedminusthesumoftheapplication
costs and bribes paid (whether or not the project is completely approved). Therefore, the
EP’s pay-off is:
u0 = pNV −
 
1≤n≤ N
(anc + pnbn). (11 )
Finally, assume that
0≤ Nc <1. (12)
The main result paralled to the case of a single bureaucrat is now stated. We should
perhaps stress that with N ≥2 bureaucrats, the following result is valid when c ≥0.
Theorem2 Thereisnoequilibriuminwhichtheprojectisapprovedwithpositiveprobability.
Hereisaninformalsketchofa“proof”.Foranequilibriumwithundominatedstrategies,
the bribes bn demanded by BUn must be all strictly positive. Hence, if the EP ever applies
to the last bureaucrat BUN(N ≥2), the bureaucrat knows that the EP has already incurred
a positive cost even when c =0. This corresponds to the case of a single BU with c >0, and
our earlier result applied to BUN(N ≥2) leads to the conclusion of Theorem 2.
In what follows we shall simply focus on
0< Nc <1. (12 )
3 We shall also write bn = (µn, θ n), where µn = Bn(1) and θ n = Bn(0) (see (8)). We shall indulge in other
abuses of notation when the meaning is clear from the context!
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It is useful to have a formal statement of the EP’s best response to any strategy proﬁle



















Lemma2 Let BU n’s strategy be B n, n=1,...N. Then the EP’s best response is:











an =1 ⇔ V >γ n(q), n>1, (18)
pn =1 ⇔ V >b +
 
m>n
[c + Bm(q)]. (19)
Ournextstepistoconstructafamilyofstrategyproﬁles,tobecallednullstrategyproﬁles
(NSP), and to show that a NSP is an equilibrium in a precise sense.
A particular NSP is characterized by parameters b 
n(q), where q=0, 1 and n=1,...,
N.H e r eb 
n(q)[≡B 
n(q)] represents the bribe that the EP expects BU n to demand, and
also the bribe that BU n plans to demand. These bribes are required to satisfy the following
conditions. Let M be a positive number such that
max(1−c,1 /2)< M <1; (20)
then
0 < b 
n(q)<1, for q =0, 1; n< N,
b 
N(q) = M,f o r q =0, 1.
The EP’s strategy is given by Lemma 2, and BU n’s strategy is to demand b 
n(q).
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As is common in game theoretic analysis, we wish to conﬁne attention to equilibria in
which the strategies are in some sense “credible”, and this involves examining the behavior
of the system off an equilibrium. To this end, it is convenient to replace the requirement
that the equilibrium strategies be undominated by a condition that we call admissibility,
whichis in somesensemoredemanding,butalsomorecomplextostateformally.First,we
say that a strategy of BU n is admissible if the bribes are strictly between 0 and 1. A bribe
proﬁle is admissible if each BU’s strategy is admissible. A strategy for the EP is admissible if
it is a best response to some admissible bribe proﬁle.
For a BU we alter somewhat the deﬁnition of an undominated strategy. An admissible
strategy for BU n is quasi-undominated if there is no other strategy that yields him or her at
l e a s ta sh i g hap a y - o f ff o ra l la d m i s s i b l es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l e so ft h eo t h e rp l a y e r s ,a n das t r i c t l y
higher pay-off for some admissible strategy proﬁle of the other players.
Finally, a strategy proﬁle is admissible if the EP’s strategy proﬁle is admissible, and
each BU’s strategy proﬁle is admissible and quasi-undominated. We can now state the
following:
Theorem3 Suppose that for each n≥q 1,
1/2<b 
n(q)<1, q =0, 1;
then the corresponding NSP is an admissible equilibrium and for every value of V, the EP does
not apply to BU 1 .4
Two points need to be stressed. First, there may be other equilibria of the one-stage
game in which the probability that the EP’s project is approved is zero. Second, in an NSP
equilibrium, each player has a zero pay-off. This property of an NSP equilibrium will be
important in the framework of the repeated game, in which the threat of reverting to an
NSP will, under certain conditions, deter a BU from deviating from “cooperative-like”
behavior.
3 A “repeated” game with multiple bureaucrats and a sequence of entrepreneurs




of periods, with a succession of EP with independent and identically distributed (i. i. d.)
project values, but the same track of BU. With a slight abuse of standard terminology, we
shall call this game the supergame. Strictly speaking, the supergame is not a repeated game,
4 This theorem is a generalization of theorem 2 in Lambert-Mogiliansky etal.(2007), which deals only with the
case of extortion. Since the extension of the proof to include the phenomenon of hold-up is straightforward, it is
omitted here.
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becausetheEPchangefromperiodtoperiod.However,becausetheprojectvaluesarei.i.d.,
the method of analysis and the attainable results are similar to those of a strictly repeated
game. In particular, repeating the one-stage null-strategy proﬁle (admissible) equilibrium
in every period, regardless of the history of play in the previous periods, is an (admissible)
equilibrium of the supergame.
LetV(t)denotethepotentialprojectvalueofEP(t),theEPinperiodt (t =0,1,2,...).
ThevaluesV(t)areindependentanduniformlydistributedovertheunitinterval(andthis
is common knowledge). Only EP(t) knows the realized value of V(t). In each period, EP(t)
and the (same) track of BUs play the game described in the last section. With an obvious
corresponding notation, action variables in period t are q(t), an(t), pn(t)a n dbn(t). A
player’s strategy determines in each period t his or her actions as a function of his or her
information about the past history of the game. The pay-off of each EP(t)i sd e ﬁ n e da s
in the one stage game (11 ). The pay-off of each BUn is the sum of the discounted one
period pay-offs, where the constant discount factor (assumed to be the same for all the
bureaucrats) is denoted by δ,0<δ<1.
In the equilibria to be studied here, the bribes demanded on the equilibrium path are
called normal bribes. On the equilibrium path, an EP applies if his or her project value
exceeds the application cost plus the normal bribes, having chosen optimally between
qualifying and not qualifying the project. Once the EP has applied and learned about the
bribe,heorshepaysiftheprojectvalueexceedsthebribe.CallthisEP’snormalbehavior.W e
say that a BU defects in a particular period if he or she demands a bribe that strictly exceeds
the normal bribe. If and when the EP learn that a defection has taken place, then all the
players will play the NSP of the one-stage game for T periods (where T, possibly inﬁnite,
is a parameter of the strategy proﬁles). These T periods constitute a punishment phase.
Afterthepunishmentphaseisover(ifever)theplayerswillreturntotheirnormalbehavior
until the next defection, if any. Of course, on the equilibrium path there is no defection
and no punishment phase. Because a defection (eventually) triggers a punishment phase,
we follow a standard terminology and call such a strategy proﬁle a trigger strategy proﬁle
(TSP). Following Aumann’s terminology if T is ﬁnite, then the TSP is relenting,w h e r e a si f
T is inﬁnite, the TSP is grim.
If the bribe demanded for a qualiﬁed project is zero, but the bribe demanded for an
unqualiﬁedprojectissufﬁciently large,thenallqualiﬁedprojectsforwhichV >rV +c will
be approved, and no bribe will be paid. We shall call this the economically efﬁcient outcome.
The set of equilibria of the supergame depends on what information the players have
abouttheprevioushistoryofthegame.Tothiseffect,we makethefollowingassumption:
Assumption 1 At the beginning of period t, all the current players know the history of all
defections (if any) in all periods up to and including the period t −D,w h e r eD≥1 is an
exogenously given parameter. All players know the history of the transactions in which they
participated.
We retain the assumption (see (12 ))
0< Nc <1, (21)
and c is the same for all EP(t).
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[c + Bn(q)]<1. (22)
The normal behavior of each EP is given by Lemma 2 (see (16)–(19)). Finally, after any
defection by some BU is known (with a D-period lag) to others, the players play the NSP
for T periods, and then return to their normal strategy proﬁle until the next defection, if
any.
Theorem4 ForanyTSPsatisfyingtheprecedingconditionsthereexist δ∗ and T∗ sufﬁciently
large such that, for all δ ≥δ∗ and T ≥T∗, the TSP is an admissible equilibrium of the
supergame. Furthermore, as the discount factor approaches unity, there is a sequence of TSP
admissible equilibria that approach economic efﬁciency.
PROOF: See the Appendix. 
3.2 Extremeequilibriaoftherepeatedgame
In this subsection we examine the properties of two classes of “extreme” equilibria of the
repeated game with multiple bureaucrats, within the class of TSP equilibria studied in the
previous section. The equilibria in the ﬁrst class, called “second-best”, maximize the social
surplus in the set of all equilibria. If the social cost caused by the approval of unqualiﬁed
projects is sufﬁciently large, then in these equilibria all projects for which the entrepreneur
appliesarequaliﬁed,providedthatthediscountfactorissufﬁcientlyclosetoone.Weprove
two results about second-best equilibria. First, the normal bribes are increasing in the
order of the bureaucrats in the track. Second, replacing the track with a single bureaucrat
increases the social surplus. The equilibria in the second class maximize the total expected
bribe income of the bureaucrats. For these equilibria (BIME), no project is qualiﬁed. For
discount factors close enough to one, it is possible for a BIME to achieve the maximum
expected bribe income that would be possible if the bureaucrats were able to collude. We
showthat,ifthis“collusiveoutcome”isnotattainableasaBIME:then(i)thenormalbribes
are increasing in the order of the bureaucrats in the track; and (ii) replacing the track with
a single bureaucrat increases the expected bribe income, and decreases social surplus. We
shall comment on the implications of these results in Section 4 below.
3.2.1 second-best equilibria
By a second-best equilibrium (SBE) is an equilibrium that minimizes (in the set of all
equilibria)thelossinexpectedtotalsocialsurplusduetothesystemofbribes.Theoutcome
implementedinaSBEwillbecalledasecond-bestoutcome.Weshallshowthatasecond-best
outcome can be implemented by a grim TSP equilibrium; that is, with a TSP for which the
punishment period lasts forever (T =∞).
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The loss in expected surplus can come from two sources. First, the system of bribes
enlarges the set of projects that are not approved but would otherwise be economically
proﬁtable. Second, unqualiﬁed projects may be approved if the corresponding bribes are
paid, resulting in some social loss. The social costs due to the approval of unqualiﬁed
projects have not played any role in the formal analysis, because it has been assumed that
the players do not take such costs into account in their own calculations. In what follows,
these costs will not be modelled explicitly. Instead, it is assumed that the social costs of
approving unqualiﬁed projects are sufﬁciently large so that, for large enough discount
factors,allprojectsthatareundertakeninasecond-bestequilibriumwillbequaliﬁed.With
this assumption, the net value of qualiﬁed projects (net of the cost of qualiﬁcation), will
be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1−r]. Hence, by a change of scale, this is
equivalent to a model in which the cost of qualiﬁcation is zero, and the bribes demanded
for unqualiﬁed projects are “sufﬁciently large”. This simpliﬁes the analysis considerably.
Before proceeding to the detailed analysis of second-best equilibria, we explain infor-
mally why second-best outcomes can be attained in the class of grim TSP equilibria, which
we shall denote by G. First, each EP participates for a single period, and he or she has no
short-run incentive to deviate from his or her equilibrium strategies in a TSP equilibrium
(neither in a normal phase nor in a punishment phase). Second, although the BUs have a
short-runincentiveinanormalphase,theyaredeterredbythethreatoftriggeringaswitch
to a punishment phase. Furthermore, if the punishment phase lasts forever, then a BU’s
payoff is zero forever once a defection is detected (after D periods). However, zero is the
lowest payoff that a BU can receive, and so the threat of triggering a switch to an inﬁnitely
long punishment phase is “maximal”. (Technically, zero is each BU’s maximum payoff .)
Hence, an equilibrium that minimizes the social loss in the set G also minimizes the social
loss in the set of all equilibria. We note that there may be second-best equilibria that are
not in G, but in what follows we conﬁne our attention to those in G.
Recallthatifallprojectsarequaliﬁed,then(seeAppendix)thesociallossisanincreasing
function of the total of the normal bribes, B ≡µ1 +µN.
Now suppose that BUn considers defecting at some period, which we may take to be
period 0. If he or she demands a bribe b,t h e na nE Pwi t hp r o j e ctv a l u eV will pay the bribe
if and only if V exceeds b plus the total of the remaining application costs and normal
bribes in the track. Given the vector µ=(µ1 ..., µN) of normal bribes, one can calculate
the optimal one-period defection payoff, υn; that is, the maximum one-period payoff that
BUn can obtain if he or she defects. On the other hand, if BUn does not defect, and he or
she and all other players continue to play their equilibrium strategies, then BUn willobtain
each period a payoff of, say, u∗
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(recall that T =∞). We can rewrite this constraint as
u∗
n −kυn ≡ fn(µ)≥0, (23)
where
k ≡ 1−δD. (24)
Hence, for a second-best equilibrium in G,t h ev e c t o rµ of bribes minimizes the total bribe,
B ≡µ1 +····+µN, subject to the constraints,
fn(µ)≥0, n=1, ..., N. (25)
In what follows, we shall refer to these last constraints as the incentive constraints.
A ﬁrst question is: which incentive constraints, if any, are binding in an SBE?
Lemma 3 For any second-best equilibrium, if k is sufﬁciently small, then all the incentive
constraints are binding.
As a corollary of the preceding lemma we have:
Theorem5 Foranysecond-bestequilibrium,ifkissufﬁcientlysmall,thenthenormalbribes
µn are strictly increasing in n.
Lemma3canalsobeusedtodeterminetheeffectofreplacingthetrackofN bureaucrats
with a “single window” of one bureaucrat, but with an application cost Nc.
Theorem6 If the track of N bureaucrats is replaced by a “single window” of one bureaucrat,
butwithanapplicationcostNc,thenthetotalsecond-bestequilibriumbribeisstrictlyreduced.
It is interesting to consider the special case in which all of the bribes in the track are
constrained to be equal. For example, this might be the case if the BU had a social norm of
“equal treatment”. Let b denote the common normal bribe. An “optimal equal-treatment
equilibrium” minimizes b in G. The argument leading to Theorem 5 implies that only the
incentive constraint for the last BU will be binding. From this it is straightforward to verify
that the optimal common normal bribe minimizes µ subject to the constraint
4µ(1− Nc − Nb)−k =0. (26)
The smaller root of this equation is
b =
(1− Nc)−[1− Nc)2 −kN]1/2
2N
, (27)
which decreases to zero as k decreases to zero. Furthermore, µ∗ is decreasing in the appli-




when c =0. Finally, it is easily veriﬁed that the total normal bribe, Nb∗, is larger than the
total normal bribe in a SBE, which is consistent with Theorem 6.
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Finally, we point out that the entire analysis of this subsection could be carried out for
the case in which, T, the length of the punishment phase, is ﬁnite (and ﬁxed). Therefore, a
third-best equilibrium would minimize the social loss in the set of all TSP equilibria (with
T ﬁxed, ﬁnite or inﬁnite). One would obtain the same results corresponding to Lemma 3
and Theorems 5 and 6, except that “second-best” would be replaced by “third-best”, and k
would be given by
k =g(δ, T, D)=
1−δD
1−δD +T . (28)
Of course, third-best equilibria would not be second-best unless T were inﬁnite.
3.2.2 Bribe-income-maximizing equilibria
A BIME is an equilibrium that maximizes, in the class of TSP equilibria,t h et o t a le x p e c t e d
bribeincomeoftheBU.Noticethatinthisdeﬁnitionwedonotrestrictthetriggerstrategies
tobegrim.Becausethepotentialproﬁtavailabletoanentrepreneur(beforesubtractingany
bribes) is maximized when his or her project is not qualiﬁed, the potential bribe income
is also maximized when no project is qualiﬁed. Therefore, in a BIME the bribes Bn(1)
demanded for qualiﬁed projects will be large enough so that no entrepreneur will qualify






Let L denote the total expected bribe income of the BU. If the BU could commit to a
bribe proﬁle they might be able to obtain a total expected bribe income larger than what
they could obtain in a TSP equilibrium. One can show that the maximum such “collusive”
expected bribe income is obtained when B = (1−Nc)/2.





n −kυn ≥0, n=1, ..., N,
θ = (θ1, ..., θN).
(30)
Corresponding to Lemma 3 we have:
Lemma 4 For any BIME, if B  = (1−Nc)/2 and if k is sufﬁciently small, then all the
incentive constraints are binding.
WeshallcallaBIMEbinding ifalloftheincentiveconstraintsarebinding.Correspond-
ing to Theorem 5 we have:
Theorem 7 For any binding BIME, if k is sufﬁciently small, then the normal bribes θn are
strictly increasing in n.
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ThetheoremthatcorrespondstoTheorem6(forsecond-bestequilibria)has,inasense,
the opposite conclusion, namely that, in the case of a binding BIME, replacing a track of N
BU with a single BU and the same total application cost increases the total expected bribe
income. However, the logic is similar in that, in both cases, replacing a track of N BU with
a single BU relaxes the incentive constraints.
Theorem8 ForanybindingBIMEwithN >1bureaucrats,replacingthetrackwithasingle
BU and the same total application cost increases the total expected bribe income.
Finally, if k is small enough, but still positive, then the BU can attain in equilibrium the
optimal collusive expected bribe income.
Theorem 9 If k is sufﬁciently small, then there is a BIME in which the total expected bribe
i n c o m ei st h em a x i m u mp o s s i b l e ,a n dB= (1−Nc)/2.
4 Implications and extensions
In this section we comment on the implications of our results for two proposed reforms,
and brieﬂy mention some directions for further research. For a fuller discussion of this
material, see Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2007).
4.1 Twopolicyimplications
Theorems6and8shedsomelightonthepotentialvalueofaproposedreformcalledcalled
the “single-window policy” or “one-stop shop”. Although there are several versions of this
reform, a common feature is that the entrepreneur meets with only a single bureaucrat.
Our analysis suggests that the single-window policy need not always lead to a reduction
in the bribe burden. Theorem 6 shows that a switch to a single window (with the same
total cost of application) in the second-best equilibrium does reduce the total amount of
the bribe, and hence, reduces the social loss. However, Theorem 8 shows that this switch
will increase the social loss in the bribe-income-maximizing equilibrium, unless the bribe
income is already the maximum possible that could be obtained through collusion of the
bureaucrats. Of course, there may be reasons to recommend the single-window policy that
are not reﬂected in our present model, such as the possible increase in the “transparency”
of the approval process and the greater likelihood of detecting illegal activities.
Our model enables us to assess another proposed reform, the rotation of bureaucrats
among tracks. The standard (informal) argument in favor of such measures is that they
reduce the opportunities for corrupt practices based on long-standing relationships. How-
ever, note that the extreme form of rotation (i.e. a change of bureaucrats every period),
corresponds to the one-stage version of our model (Section 2), in which the system of
bribes causes the process of project approval to break down completely. However, the
“long-standing relationship” corresponds to the repeated-game model of Section 3, with a
multiplicityofequilibriainwhichbothprojectapprovalandbriberytakeplace.Itisbeyond
thescopeofthispapertodiscussthemanypossiblerotationpoliciesbuthereisonethatcan
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beanalyzedexplicitlyintheframeworkofourmodel.Supposethateachtrackhasaconstant
per-period probability, π, of being replaced by another track with different bureaucrats.
Therefore, π =0 gives us our model of the inﬁnitely repeated game with one track, and
π =1 gives us our model of the one-stage game. One can show that increasing this prob-
ability is formally equivalent to reducing the discount factor. This, in turn, increases the
mediatingparameterk (28).Becausethereisamultiplicityofequilibriaforeachvalueof k,
the effect of decreasing k is ambiguous without a rule that selects a unique equilibrium for
each value of k. For example, if we focus on, say, the bribe-income-maximizing equilibria,
then an increase in π leads to a decrease in social loss. In contrast, in the third-best (and,





relevant properties of the density function of V. Second, the model itself can be enriched
(and, from anecdotal evidence, made more realistic) by introducing other agents: like
intermediaries who facilitate the payment of bribes and make enforcement of laws more
difﬁcult. Finally, it would be useful to formally model supervision and detection.
Appendix
ProofsofTheorem1andLemma1
WeﬁrstproveLemma1.EPwillpaythebribebiffV >b.TheconditionaldistributionofV,giv enthath ≤V ≤k,
is uniform on the interval [h, k]. BU’s optimal bribe maximizes b Pr{V >b|h ≤V ≤k},a n d





b(k −b)/(k −h), h ≤b ≤k,
0, b ≥k.
An elementary calculation now yields the conclusion of the lemma. 
To prove Theorem 2.1 (in the case in which c >0), we ﬁrst calculate EP’s best response to a strategy, B,o ft h e









The entrepreneur does apply if and only if the project’s value exceeds the sum of the relevant costs, that is, if and
only if
V >c + Q(V)(rV+µ)+[1− Q(V)]θ. (33)
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If EP has applied, and BU demands a bribe b,t h e nE Pp a y si f fV >b. (Any costs previously incurred by EP are
“sunk”.)
Case1 0<(θ −µ)/r <1.








and V >c +θ, (in which case q =0) ;





























and that the ﬁrst set of inequalities is equivalent to
(1−r)θ>µ+rc. (37)



















⇒ q =a =1,
θ −µ
r









In this case, EP’s best response satisﬁes:
V < c +θ ⇒ q =a =0,
V > c +θ ⇒ q =0a n da =1. (39)
Case2 θ ≤µ .
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In this case, for all V >0,rV+µ>θ,a n d,he n c e,Q(V)=0.Therefore, EP’sbest response satisﬁes the same
condition as in Case 1.2.
Case3 θ −µ≥r.








⇒ q =a =1. (40)
We now examine the possibility of an equilibrium in each of the above cases.













































































unless θ =0. However, µ=θ =0 yields BU a payoff of zero, against any strategy of EP, and, hence, is weakly
dominated. Therefore, there is no equilibrium in this region, even if c =0.








which strictly exceeds θ unless c =0. Hence, no equilibrium exists in this region unless c =0.
Case2 Inthiscase,asinCase1.2,q=0,andifa=1,thenV >c +θ.Itfollows,asinCase1.2,thatnoequilibrium
exists in this region unless c =0.
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rV+µ=rV<θ,f o r a l l V <1.
Hence, a=1f o ra l lV <1, so that BU’s payoff is zero with probability one. Hence, in this region there is no
equilibrium in undominated strategies, even if c =0. This concludes the proof of the ﬁrst part of the theorem with
c >0.
It remains to consider the second part of the theorem, with c =0. Because application is costless, EP will apply,





falls under Cases 1.2 or 2, and, hence, EP’s best response requires that Q(V)=0f o ra l lV.E Pw i l lp a yt h eb r i b e
demanded if and only if it is strictly less than V. Hence, we have shown that the strategy of EP described by the
theorem is a best response to BU’s strategy.
Because Q(V)=0f o ra l lV, the fact that the project is not qualiﬁed carries no information about the





Suppose now that EP applies with a qualiﬁed project (i.e. a =q =1). Because this behavior is contrary to
EP’s strategy, we must describe what beliefs BU infers about the value of V.W es h a l ls u p p o s et h a tB Ub e l i e v e s











then take h =µ, k =1, and again BU’s optimal bribe is µ. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 4
TheproofofTheorem4usescalculationsthatarestandardinthepublishedliterature,soweprovideonlyasketch.
Let u∗
n denote BUn’s expected one period pay off during a normal phase and V n denote the least upper bound for
the expected payoff to BUn from a defection, say in period 0. Then one can calculate that a defection is deterred if
(1+δ +····+δD −1)vn ≤(1+···· +δD +T −1)u∗
n,











and this limit is approached monotonically. Hence, for all T “sufﬁciently large” and δ “sufﬁciently close to unity”,
BUn does not defect.
Note that if µ tends to 0 and θ remains sufﬁciently large, then all EPs who apply will qualify their projects.








One can verify that if µ tends to 0 and θ remains large, the ratio u∗
n/vn tends to zero. However, for any ﬁnite ratio
vn/u∗
n,t h e r ei sap a i r( δ, T) such that the corresponding TSP is an admissible equilibria.
Second-bestequilibria:ProofsofLemma3,Theorem5,andTheorem6
Recall that bn is the normal bribe demanded by BUn in an equilibrium in G. Recall, too, that in a second-best
equilibrium all active projects are qualiﬁed. Hence, without loss of generality, by a change in scale one can take




(c +µn), 1≤n≤ N,





ab r i b eb, then an EP with project value V will pay the bribe if and only if V >b +C n+1.H e n c e ,B U n’s optimal
defection demand, b 
n, maximizes
bPr{V >b +Cn+1|V >C},
which is equal to




,i fC ≤ b +Cn+1 ≤1,
0, if 1 ≤ b +Cn+1.
(45)
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Henceforth, we shall assume that equation (47) is satisﬁed, which implies that b 
n >C −C n+1.





However, BUn’s normal expected one-period payoff is
u∗
n =µn(1−C), (50)
since EP(t) will apply only if V(t)>C.H e n c e ,B U n is deterred from defection if and only if
υn ≤ g(δ, D, ∞)u∗
n,w h e r e










µ = (µ1, ..., µN),
k = 1−δD.
(51)
Assume that δ and D a r es u c ht h a t
0<k <1, (52)







Hence, a second-best vector µ of bribes minimizes C subject to
fn(µ)≥0, n=1, ..., N. (53)
Recall that these last inequalities are called the incentive constraints.
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To prove Lemma 3, suppose, to the contrary, that µ is the vector of normal bribes for a SBE, and that for




hn  = 0, n=1, ..., N,
(54)
and deﬁne
yn(h)=µn +hn, n=1, ...N, (55)
y(h)=[y1(h), ..., yN(h)]. (56)
Note that C remains unchanged as h changes.
Recall that in an equilibrium with undominated strategies every normal bribe must be strictly positive.
Hence, because the functions f N are continuous, for every sufﬁciently small k there exists h sufﬁciently small (in
the Euclidean metric, and satisfying (54), such that
fn[y(h)]>0, n=1, ..., N. (57)
Because µn >0f o re v e r yn, C >Nc.H e n c e ,t h e r ee x i s t sav e c t o rz = (z1,..., zN) sufﬁciently close to y(h)s u c h
that
zn > 0, n=1, ..., N,
fn(zn) ≥ 0, n=1, ..., N,
N  
1
zn + Nc < C.
Hence, z is the vector of normal bribes in a TSP equilibrium with a smaller social loss than that of µ,s oµ could
not be a SBE. 













For an undominated equilibrium, every normal bribe must be strictly positive; hence, C n is strictly decreasing in
n (even if c =0), and so the conclusion of the theorem follows from the preceding equation.





Note that C = B +Nc. From equation (53), the total bribe, B,i naS B Eo ft h et r a c kw i t hN bureaucrats satisﬁes
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Note that, for the track of N BUs,
 
n
(1−Cn+1)2 >(1−CN +1)2 =1.
Hence, a single bribe equal to B satisﬁes the single BU’s incentive constraint with a strict inequality. Therefore,
the single BU can demand a bribe strictly less than B without violating his incentive constraint, which concludes
the proof of the theorem. 
Bribe-income-maximizingequilibria




θn, C = B + Nc. (60)
Without loss of generality we may assume that C <1. The normal expected bribe income of BUn,a n dt h et o t a l
expected bribe income are, respectively,
u∗
n =θn(1−C), (61)
L = B(1−C). (62)
L is maximized when B = (1−Nc)/2.









In this case, however, we cannot rule out either of the two expressions on the right-hand side. The corresponding














Again, as in (53), the incentive constraints are
fn(θ) = u∗
n −kυn ≥0, n=1, ..., N,
θ = (θ1, ..., θN).
(65)
With these formulas, the proofs of Lemma 4 and Theorems 7 – 9 are straightforward, and are omitted. 
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